'In truth, the gold standard is already a barbarous relic. All of us, from the Governor of the Bank of England downwards, are now primarily interested in preserving the stability of business, prices, and employment, and are not likely, when the choice is forced upon us, deliberately to sacrifice these to the outworn dogma, which had value once, of k3. All too often, scant mention is made of the interwar gold standard, for it is not evident how interwar experience fits into either view. Certain facts are clear. It is clear that the interwar standard was far from durable; Britain's resumption of gold payments in I925 usually is taken to mark the gold standard's resurrection, just as her devaluation a mere 6 years later is taken as its demise. In the interim many of the major participants suffered serious balance of payments pressures that threatened to render their exchange rates indefensible. The system was anything but conducive to stability; it precluded neither price nor income fluctuations, as the Great Depression dramatically illustrated.
The classical gold standard occupies an almost mystical position in the literature of international finance. In popular accounts the gold standard is portrayed as a remarkably durable and efficient mechanism for achieving price and exchange rate stability and for relieving balance of payments pressures. The system's resilience is attributed to the willingness of nationa) monetary authorities to refrain from impeding the international adjustment process. When central banks intervened in financial markets, it is said, they did so mechanically, obeying 'rules of the game' which dictated that they reinforce the impact on domestic money and credit of changing balance of payments conditions. Succeeding generations of economists and historians have sought to qualify this popular view. The recent contributions of Bordo (I98I) and Cooper (i982) make a critical assessment of extravagant claims concerning price and exchange rate stability under the classical gold standard. Other authors have extended the research of Bloomfield (I 959), Ford (I962) and Triffin (I964), who emphasised the special conditions that permitted the classical gold standard's smooth operation and cast doubt on the tendency of national monetary authorities to adhere faithfully to 'rules of the game."
All too often, scant mention is made of the interwar gold standard, for it is not evident how interwar experience fits into either view. Certain facts are clear. It is clear that the interwar standard was far from durable; Britain's resumption of gold payments in I925 usually is taken to mark the gold standard's resurrection, just as her devaluation a mere 6 years later is taken as its demise. In the interim many of the major participants suffered serious balance of payments pressures that threatened to render their exchange rates indefensible. The system was anything but conducive to stability; it precluded neither price nor income fluctuations, as the Great Depression dramatically illustrated.
Numerous explanations have been advanced for the interwar gold standard's I985]
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Bank Rate was changed only half as often as it had been over the 6 year period preceding the War, or as it had been on average over the period I890-I9I3. Between I925 and I93I, Bank Rate was Jeft unchanged for more than a year on three separate occasions, whereas comparable stability had been achieved only once between I890 and I9I3 (see Chart I). Although it appeared that Bank Rate eventually was adjusted in the required direction, it seemed as if the Bank of England had grown reluctant to act and was waiting for conditions to deteriorate past a critical threshold before responding to events.' The discount rate was only one of several instruments at the Bank of England's command. The others included open market operations, intervention in gold and foreign exchange markets, and the use of moral suasion. Bank Rate is by no means the perfect measure of the stance of monetary policy. However, Bank Rate was 'that most orthodox instrument of monetary control' and a crucial barometer for many domestic interest rates and expectations.'2 It was the most visible and controversial of the Bank's instruments, and as such is the variable most likely, when subjected to detailed analysis, to yield information on the pressures and considerations influencing the formulation of policy.
In this paper we take a close look at Bank Rate policy in the period I925-3I, the years of Britain's participation in the interwar gold standard. We begin with an analysis of contemporary views of discount rate management.3 This account suggests that an appraisal of whether the Bank of England's discount rate policy contributed to the instability of the interwar gold standard must start by addressing three questions. First, was policy asymmetric in the sense that the Bank raised its discount rate upon losing reserves but failed to lower it upon gaining them? Secondly, was the Bank responsive not only to the balance of payments but also to internal conditions when making Bank Rate decisions? Thirdly, did the Bank take domestic conditions into account primarily when the level of Bank Rate and numbers unemployed exceeded a certain level?
To address these questions, we employ a reaction function framework in the spirit of those applied previously to the study of discount policy under the classical gold standard by Goodhart (1 972), Dutton (1 984) To estimate this relationship, we develop a dynamic econometric model designed to account for the discrete quality of our dependent variable. Bank Rate was changed very infrequently during our sample period, and each change that took place was in increments of fifty basis points. To model its determinants, we specify and estimate a dynamic generalisation of the static ordered probit model. This model is discussed in detail in Section II. The likelihood function associated with the model involves a normal distribution of the same dimension as the sample size. Evaluation of this distribution poses significant computational difficulties. Fortunately, the underlying density has a special Markov form which makes the evaluation of the distribution possible. In the Appendix we present our method for evaluating the required multivariate normal distribution. According to Keynes' account, a rise in Bank Rate depressed domestic activity in two ways. By raising the price of bank credit, it increased the cost of holding inventories, thereby inducing businessment to liquidate their stocks, reducing final goods prices, and discouraging additional production.' At the same time, the higher cost of credit rendered physical investment less attractive. Together these two effects depressed the level of employment and ultimately put downward pressure on money wages. Once costs fell sufficiently to restore full employment, lBritish goods again would be rendered competitive in international markets and external balance would be insured.2 if, according to Keynes, Bank Rate restored external balance by creating unemployment, the gospel according to Montagu Norman was of a very different sort. In Norman's view, the ill effects of an increase in Bank Rate were greatly exaggerated and 'more psychological than real.' While admitting that a rise in Bank Rate would induce holders of inventories to liquidate their stocks, Norman denied that industrial activity would be noticeably affectedA3 Insofar as industrial investment responded to interest rate fluctuations, it was long-term rates that he thought relevant. And according to the conventional wisdom, a rise in Bank Rate would fall primarily on the cost of short-term bank credit. Only when a high Bank Rate was maintained for an extended period would long-term interest rates and, by inference, industrial investment respond.
Another distinction commonly drawn was between the effects of a change in a low Bank Rate and the effects of a change in a high one. According to this view, the link between Bank Rate and interest rates on bank credit was binding only when Bank Rate exceeded a certain threshold. It was argued that Bank Rate had little if any effect on the cost of bank loans and overdrafts until it exceeded four per cent. Although advances regarded as 'fair banking risks' typically were extended at rates I % above Bank Rate, these rates normally were subject to a floor of 5%. (The same convention applied to large customers, except that the margin over Bank Rate was half a point with a floor of 41 %.) Thus, Sir Ernest mentioned by the Cunliffe Committee, as part of the 'traditional doctrine,' his account was dispufted from the outset, and these matters were to be the subject of extended exchanges over the course of subsequent weeks. 2 It is instructive to contrast this description of the adjustment process with the price specie flow mechanism associated with David Hume. The price specie flow model emphasises the impact of relative prices on comrnodity trade and hence on the balance of payments and international reserve flows. A deterioration in the external accounts leads to reserve losses, monetary deflation, and falling wages and prices. This enhances the competitiveness of domestic goods, restoring external balance. In the model described by Keynes before the Macmillan Committee, the link between monetary deflation and wages was broken, at least in the short run. With wages slow to respond, the loss of reserves, reinforced by the impact of an increase in Bank Rate on the domestic credit base, checked demand and gave rise to unemployment. Given prices, monetary contraction reduced the supply of real balances, requiring higher interest rates to clear the money market. Spending would be reduced by both the wealth effect on consumption and the interest rate effect on investment. Only with time as wage rates fell would industrial employment recover. 2 The new convention has a curious history. It seems to have originated in a footnote added to a new edition of Bagehot's Lombard Street (I873) in I90I by the editor E. Johnstone. Bagehot had quoted Goschen to the effect that changes in discount rates exert a weak influence over international gold flows and then attributed to him (apparently erroneously) the suggestion that Bank Rate increases for the purpose of attracting gold be taken in one point steps. The new footnote in the I90I edition read: 'Occasionally the Bank now moves by steps of a per cent; but the rule that may be said to be broadly observed is that, while in lowering the rate it may be expedient to move by steps of j per cent, in raising it the advance should be by steps of i per cent' (PRO TI 76/I3, Hawtrey to Niemeyer; undated but apparently November I923 It is obvious from our data that the Bank of England did not adjust Bank Rate continuously in response to economic conditions. The discount rate was altered only i6 times during our 328 week sample. Of these i6 changes in the rate, I2 were decreases and the remaining 4 were increases. Each of the decreases was exactly 50 basis points and each of the increases was exactly ioo basis points.
This discrete quality of our data indicates that standard time series regression techniques are inappropriate. We require an econometric model which explicitly accounts for the discrete nature of the dependent variable. Unfortunately, most econometric methods which account for the discrete nature of the data fail to account for its serial correlation.1 Here we develop a model which is a dynamic generalisation of the static ordered probit model in order to capture both the discreteness and the serial correlation in the data.
We will denote the level of Bank Rate at time t by BRt and collect the independent variables at time t into a k x I vector Xt. In our sample ABRt can take on only three values, -50, o, or Ioo basis points. Our dynamic econometric model will determine the probability of these events as functions of current Xt and past values of both Xt and BRt. We denote this information set by Jt, so that the econometric model will determine 
where Jt = (Xt, BRt-1, ..., BR1, X1).
Our specification will generate these probabilities from the t-variate normal distrlbution and can be viewed as a dynamic generalisation of the static ordered probit model. To motivate our specification let ABI?* denote the change in an unobserved 'underlying' Bank Rate that is generated by an ordinary linear regression equation ABR* = XtP +et)
with etf IJt -Niid (o, -2).
The observed Bank Rate changes whenever it is too far away from BRt* according to the rule ABRt =-50 if BR* < BRt1--,,
ABRt = o if BRt_--< BRt* < BRt-,+. While our model is broadly similar to the usual ordered probit model, there are two major differences. First, while our equation (5) describes the changes in BR*, the inequalities in (6)-(8) concern its level. This feature introduces stochastic dynamics into BRt through the accumulation of the disturbance terms Et. Second, in contrast to the standard ordered probit model, we include in the inequalities (6)-(8) the observed time series, BRt-1. This has implications for the identifiability of parameters in the model. Equations (5)-(8) can be used to express the probability of Bank Rate movements as functions of the variables in the information set Jt, the unknown parameters fi, o2, Ocl, oc., and the initial value BR*. These probabilities can be used to form the likelihood function of the data, and estimates of the parameters can be found by maximising this function. While this procedure is straightforward in principle, the dynamic nature of the model makes it quite difficult in practice. In the appendix we derive the likelihood function and present a method for its evaluation. To derive the results presented in Section IV, we used this method to evaluate the function and the Berndt et al. (I974) algorithm to maximise it.
III. DATA
In Table I we present mnemonics and summary descriptions of the variables used in estimation. The remainder of this section discusses the sources and characteristics of these data.
We gathered weekly observations for all variables from the first week of April I925 through to the third week of September unilaterally at other times of the week, there, were no 'Governor's raises' during our sample period. In contrast to previous studies employing monthly and annual observations, our use of weekly data minimises the loss of information caused by averaging weekly changes. In addition, the use of weekly data enables us to make realistic assumptions about the latest information available to the Bank.
The value of gold and foreign exchange held by the Bank of England was calculated by the Bank's chief cashier and reported in the Bank's weekly return. The return covered the period from Thursday to the subsequent Wednesday and was available to the Committee of Treasury on the following morning. These figures for gold and foreign exchange reserves are collected by Sayers (I976,  volume 3, pp. 349-55) , from where our series is drawn. We denote positive and negative changes in reserves as AG+ and AG -.
Exchange rates were reported daily in the financial press. It is conceivable that members of the Committee could have obtained subsequent information through early morning telephone calls to exchange dealers, but we assume that they relied on quotations up to the Wednesday close-of-business rate reported in the Thursday papers. A number of different bilateral rates could be considered. Here we concentrate on the sterling/dollar rate for cable transactions at the close of business on Wednesday, as published in Thursday's Wall Street Journal. When a major holiday fell on a Wednesday and the markets were closed, the previous day's close-of-business rate is used.
The same conventions are used in collecting interest rate data. For the London rate, we employ the rate on go day bankers drafts at the close of business on 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The results of estimating variants of (I) using OLS and our maximum likelihood procedure are shown in Table 2 .2 The fit of the equations is adequate; the 1 The limitations of these unemployment figures are well known. The count of the unemployed was not an unbiased estimate but merely a tabulation of the number of persons who chose to register themselves as out of work at an Employment Exchange. The benefits conferred to unemployed persons under the provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Acts provided an incentive to register despite the inconvenience. Therefore, changes in the provisions and administration of the Insurance Acts independently influenced the statistics. Garside (I980) discusses six legislative and administrative changes during our sample period with an impact on the recorded figures for numbers employed. The most important changes appear to be those of April I928, when conditions for the receipt of benefit were relaxed, and May 1930, when the 'genuinely seeking work' clause was eliminated.
2 In all models we have included a constant term because some of our right-hand side variables may not have zero mean while our left-hand side variable does. The last four rows of Table 2 show the likelihood value, L, and the estimates of three parameters, a, BR*, and p. a is the sum of the upper and lower threshold parameters a1 and cz.3 The estimated value of a in all of the modeJs is close to 15. This suggests that conditions could change quite substantially before causing a discrete change in Bank Rate. BR* is the estimate of the initial value of the underlying Bank Rate; in all cases it is very close to 5 %, the initial value of BR. p is 1 Although space limitations allow us to report complete results for only three of the specifications) we will mention other relevant results during the course of the discussion. 2 We present no MLE in the text for models including the dollar/pound exchange rate, E. Results for an equation including A TB appear in column 3. When E was added to the ML specification, convergence proved to be very sensitive to the initial values chosen for the parameters. We have estimated a model using our ML procedure and the parameter values shown in column 2 of Table 2 as initial values (so that the coefficient on the exchange rate was initialised at zero). The likelihood value increased very slightly and the coefficient on the exchange rate increased only from o to -o-oooI with a standard error of o0ooog, while the other parameter estimates changed very little. 3 In the discussion of the model in the appendix we show that only a = au-at and the initial value of BR* are identified. What do these results imply for the questions posed at the outset? The first question -was policy asyinmetric in the sense that the Bank of England was more inclined to raise its discount rate upon losing reserves than to lower it upon gaining them -can be answered in the affirmative. Our findings suggest that in posing the second question -was the Bank responsive not only to the balance of payments but to internal conditions as well -it is critically important to distinguish different dimensions of internal conditions and the different constituencies affected by policy. We find only weak evidence that the Bank was responsive in its discount rate policy to fluctuations in the numbers unemployed. In contrast, we infer that the Bank was more sensitive to factors affecting the cost of credit to domestic finance and trade on the basis of the estimated coefficients for the variable BRhjgh. These estimates also suggest a positive answer to our third question of whether the Bank looked beyond balance of payments conditions primarily when the level of Bank Rate exceeded a crucial level.
What do these answers impiy for the role of the Bank of England in the operation of the interwar gold standard? They suggest that the Bank's asymmetrical response to international reserve flows shifted the burden of adjustment onto deficit countries during periods when Britain was in surplus, disrupting the symmetric adjustment process posited under the 'rules of the game.' They suggest that the Bank of England's willingness to use Bank Rate to defend its reserves was qualified by its concern with internal economic conditions and with the anticipated impact of its discount rate on the domestic economy. . (I983) ). Fortunately, the distribution that we must evaluate has a special structure that can be exploited.
We exploit this structure and produce an approximation that can be made arbitrarily accurate at the cost of increased computation. Our approximation appears to be quite accurate and can be used to evaiuate any T-variate normal distribution which arises from an underlying density with Markov structure. This approximation replaces the conditional density, h(6tIJt), by a weighted sum of normal densities. Its accuracy increases with the number of densities in the sum.
The approximation follows directly from the equation h(6tlJt) = ; 0(6 6tg(6t-_ I t) d6t_j.
We assume that the expression on the r.h.s. is a definite integral so that if The motivation behind the approximation is quite simple. The multivariate integral in (i i') is viewed as an iterated integral. The Markov structure of 6t gives the iterated integral a particularly simple form requiring the repeated evaluation of functions like h(6tIJt). This function arises from an integral which we approximate as a Riemann sum. Clearly as k -oo our approximation approaches the value of the likelihood function. This follows directly from the definition of the integral.
In our empirical application we had little a priori knowledge of the quality of the approximation for various values of k. Through experimentation we found the k = 20 yielded an adequate approximation. Larger vaJues of k produced a slightly better approximation but at a much higher cost. In Table A 
